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THIS IS A STICK UP! ROBBING CITIZENS OF THEIR
SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND THE DEMISE OF THE
POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM IN NATIONAL
RIGHT-TO-CARRY LEGISLATION
P. Kramer Rice*
INTRODUCTION
The personal ownership and possession of firearms pre-dated the Union,
occupied the minds of the Framers, and compelled states to ratify the Second
Amendment. More than 200 years later in 2010, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed that history by protecting the place of firearms in the American Story,
incorporating as enforceable against the states the Second Amendment right to own
and possess a handgun.' As of that same year, approximately 118 million handguns
were either available for sale or already owned within the United States. The most
common way handgun owners exercise their Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms is through concealed carry,3 and while the federal government maintains
minimal oversight of the shipment and maintenance of firearms and dangerous
weapons, states regulate the rest, enforcing eligibility and possession requirements
for the licensing of concealed handguns.4
Because of the regulatory role the states have maintained in shaping the
contours of Second Amendment rights, the Second Amendment necessarily
implicates principles of federalism.' Yet, every year since incorporation, the Senate
or the House of Representatives has challenged state laws regulating Second
Amendment rights by putting put forth national legislation for reciprocal state
recognition of out-of-state concealed carry handgun licenses ("CHLs").6 These
proposed national right-to-carry laws now animate the gun control policy debate,
* JD Candidate 2013, Notre Dame Law School.
1. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).
2. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-717, GuN CONTROL: STATES' LAWS AND
REQUIREMENTS FOR CONCEALED CARRY PERMITS VARY ACROSS NATION 1 (2012) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT].
3. Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REv. 1, 45 (2012) (citing David B.
Kopel, The Right to Arms in the Living Constitution, 2010 CARDOZO L. REv. 99, 126 (2010)).
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.B.2. It has even been suggested that the Second Amendment is a "federalism
provision" incapable of incorporation. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3111 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Respecting States' Rights and Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2013, H.R. 578, 113th
Cong. (2013), Respecting States' Rights and Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2012, S. 2213, 112th Cong.
(2012), Secure Access to Firearms Enhancement (SAFE) Act of 2011, H.R. 2900, 112th Cong. (2011). But
see, e.g., The Common Sense Concealed Firearms Permit Act of 2011, S. 176, 112th Cong. (2011)
(establishing national standards for concealed carry permits).
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which has experienced an invigorated revival in the wake tragic events involving
gun violence and presidential proposals for federal gun control measures.
Exemplifying national right-to-carry legislation generally, and the only CHL
reciprocity bill passed in either house of Congress, is the House of Representatives'
National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of 2011 ("NRTC" or "Act").' Standing as
the most "sweeping firearms law in nearly two decades,"' the NRTC relaxes gun
regulations by mandating reciprocal state recognition of out-of-state CHLs,'0
providing individuals wishing to carry a concealed handgun across states broad
federal protection to do so." Like local challengers' claims against restrictive
federal gun control proposals, national challengers to the permissive regulation of
the NRTC claim the NRTC violates principles of federalism. 2 Because the history
and protection of Second Amendment rights necessarily includes state regulation,
and because the Tenth Amendment reinforces such state prerogative on gun
control,14 opponents to national gun regulation-both restrictive and permissive-
always fault federal proposals for failing to respect the province of states to pass
firearm laws representative of their citizens' interests.
This Note considers the constitutionality of the National Right-to-Carry
Reciprocity Act of 2011 in light of the principles of federalism underlying the
recurring challenges to federal firearms law. Although the Supreme Court's
incorporation of the Second Amendment constricts the breadth of any state gun
restrictions, the Second Amendment does not mandate the abolition of all state gun
7. In wake of the fatal shootings occurring in Aurora, Colorado and Newtown, Connecticut, President
Barack Obama put forth his Now is the Time Campaign, wherein he sought strong federal regulatory
measures, such as a ban on the sale of assault weapons and a requirement of universal background checks on
all gun purchasers, to combat gun violence. See Now IS THE TIME: THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN TO PROTECT OUR
CHILDREN AND OUR COMMUNITIES BY REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE (Jan. 16, 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/wh-now-isthe-timefull.pdf [hereinafter Now IS THE
TIME]. Responsively, some senators have called for national reciprocity of concealed carry to serve as de
facto background checks. See, e.g., Rubio on Gun Control (NBC Television broadcast April 14, 2013),
available at http://www.nbcnews.com/videolmeet-the-press/51534273.
8. H.R. 822, 112th Cong. (2011).
9. While some in the media were quick to label Now is the Time the most "sweeping firearms law in
nearly two decades," a mere two years earlier the House of Representative passed the NRTC, which, because
it impacts not only ownership rights, as addressed in Now is the Time, but also the carriage rights, is the most
sweeping gun control law passed within two decades. See Laura Meckler, Peter Nicholas, and Colleen
Nelson, Obama's Gun Curbs Face a Slog in Congress, WALL STREET JOURNAL, January 16, 2013, available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323968304578245720749827656.html?mod=WSJLEFTT
opStories (labeling inaccurately Now is the Time as the most recent and the most sweeping gun legislation is
the past two decades).
10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra Parts I and IV.
12. Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant charged that his state would resist federal limits on firearms
controls. See Emily Pettus, Bryant: Miss. should resist federal limits on guns, KATC.COM (January 16, 2013,
5:51 PM) http://www.katc.com/news/byant-miss-should-resist-federal-limits-on-guns/. For state-based
challenges to the NRTC, see infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part I and Part 111.2.
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
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regulations." Even as Circuit Courts are split as to the propriety of states' selective
gun licensure regulations," specifically concealed carry regulation," the Supreme
Court has confirmed twice the constitutionality of such selective gun licensure.18
Nonetheless, the House of Representatives' invocation of its Commerce Clause
power to pass the NRTC undermines state autonomy and interest in local gun
licensure by requiring state enforcement of respective concealed carry
requirements.
Ultimately, because the NRTC fails to respect the place of states in crafting
Second Amendment law, the Act likely is unconstitutional. Below, Part I discusses
the text and history of the National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of 2011. Part II
comparatively analyzes existing state eligibility requirements for CHLs. Part III
provides an overview of the governing standard of review for laws challenged on
federalism grounds-a structural review derived from the Tenth Amendment and
grounded in the Constitutional allotment of political representation of states in
Congress-and how that review of political safeguards has developed within
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, particularly as it pertains to traditional state
function, clear statement, and anti-commandeering principles. Part III also
discusses Supreme Court cases concerning the Second Amendment and the split in
Circuit Courts concerning the meaning and application of those precedents as
applied to CHLs. Part IV concludes that the National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity
Act's federal mandate likely is beyond Congress' Commerce Clause power because
first, it infringes upon the traditional state function to police concealed handgun
licensure,19 and second, even assuming Congress acted within its power to regulate
interstate commerce, the Act improperly neuters the political safeguards of
20federalism structured in the Constitution.
I. H.R. 822: THE NATIONAL RIGHT-TO-CARRY RECIPROCITY ACT OF 2011
States issuing CHLs most regularly allow license holders to carry a loaded
handgun, such as a pistol or revolver, on their person, in their vehicle, or in public
and in such a manner that the handgun is not visible to others.2 On November 16,
2011, the House of Representatives passed pursuant to its Commerce Clause power
22
the NRTC, providing three substantive measures broadening the manner in which
CHL holders may lawfully own and possess a handgun.2 First, the Act's primary
15. See infra Part III.B.2.
16. See infra Part Ill.B.3.
17. See infra notes 139-158 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 122-133 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part IV.A.
20. See infra Part IV.B.
21. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.
22. See House Vote #852 on National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of2011, GOVTRACK.US (Nov. 16,
HR. 822, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/1 12-201 1/h852 (showing
House Vote #852 and H.R. 822 passing by a vote of 272 to 154).
23. See infra notes 24-37 and accompanying text. In addition to its substantive requirements, the NRTC
also has two administrative requirements: the Comptroller General must conduct an audit of concealed carry
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provision allows individuals with valid state-issued CHLs to carry a concealed
firearm in any other state that also issues CHLs or does not prohibit the carrying of
concealed firearms.2 4 Second, the NRTC leaves in place non-eligibility regulations,
that is, the Act leaves untouched those state laws controlling the manner of handgun
ownership and possession; the NRTC does not affect pre-existing state laws
governing how concealed firearms are possessed or carried because reciprocal
licensees are subject to the same conditions of limitation imposed by federal, state,
and local law to residents of that state.25 For example, regulations banning the
possession of guns in state parks, schools, and government buildings remain intact
26
and enforceable to all violators. Third, the law does not impact a state's eligibility
requirements for its own residents; the NRTC proscribes individuals from relying
on the reciprocity of state recognition to carry a concealed weapon in their home
state under the permit or license of another state when their home state otherwise
forbids them from possessing or carrying a gun.2
Typical of Second Amendment legislation, the legislative debate surrounding
the passage of the NRTC pitted two opposing sides on the issue of whether the law
offends federalism and impedes states' rights.28 According to (former)
Representative Steams, a co-sponsor of the NRTC, the Act does not offend
federalism because it "does not set up a federal carry permit system or establish any
laws and regulations of each state as well as a study on the ability of local law enforcement to verify the
validity of out-of-state permits or licenses. See H.R. 822, at §§ 3-4.
24. See National Right-to-Carry Act, supra note 8, at § 926D(a)(l)-(2) (2011).
(a) Notwithstanding any provision of the law of any State or political subdivision thereof (except
as provided in subsection (b)), a person who is not prohibited by Federal law from possessing,
transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm, and who is carrying a valid identification document
containing a photograph of the person, and a valid license or permit which is issued pursuant to the
law of a State and which permits the person to carry a concealed firearm, may possess or carry a
concealed handgun (other than a machinegun or destructive device) that has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce, in any State, other than the State of residence of the
person, that-
(1) has a statute that allows residents of the State to obtain licenses or permits to carry
concealed firearms; or
(2) does not prohibit the carrying of concealed firearms by residents of the State for lawful
purposes.
Accord Respecting States' Rights and Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2013, H.R. 578, 113th Cong.
(2013).
25. See National Right-to-Carry Act, supra note 8, at § 926D(b).
(b) The possession or carrying of a concealed handgun in a State under this section shall be subject
to the same conditions and limitations, except as to eligibility to possess or carry, imposed by or
under Federal or State law or the law of a political subdivision of a State, that apply to the
possession or carrying of a concealed handgun by residents of the State or political subdivision
who are licensed by the State or political subdivision to do so, or not prohibited by the State from
doing so.
Accord H.R. 578.
26. See National Right-to-Carry Act, supra note 8 at § 926D(a)-(b); H.R. 578; see also Jim Abrams, HR
822 Concealed Carry Gun Bill Passes House Vote, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 16, 2011, 5:57 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/16/hr-822-concealed-carry-bill-n_1097997.html ("A state's ban on
carrying concealed weapons in places such as bars, sporting events or state parks would apply to nonresidents
as well as residents.").
27. See supra note 26.
28. See supra note 22 (seven Republicans rejecting it, forty-three Democrats supporting it).
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federal regulation of concealed carry permits .. . [t]hat power remains with the
states."29 Conversely, opponents claim that the legislation "jeopardize[s] public
safety and [is] an insult to states ... that purposefully have strong gun ownership
,,30 31laws. The Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, a nonpartisan group,
states that the NRTC undermines state laws." Proponents of the law respond to
detractors by highlighting the Act's purpose-to "guarantee[] citizens'
constitutional rights as affirmed by ... D.C. v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago"
and to protect the "fundamental" right to defend oneself and loved ones from
criminals." Supporters of the Act believe the Second Amendment is a right that
should not be extinguished when an individual crosses a state border.34
Congressman Lamar Smith, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, compares
interstate recognition of concealed carry permits to the manner in which drivers'
licenses are recognized in other states and suggests that universalizing the
recognition of CHLs ensures that lawful CHL holders do not unwittingly violate
out-of-state laws.
II. FEDERAL FIREARMS LAW & STATE CONCEALED
CARRY ELIGIBILITY REGULATION
A. Federal Firearms Law
Currently there are no federal laws addressing the issuance of CHLs at the state
level; rather, state issuance of CHLs is subject to the federal Gun Control Act
(GCA), to which the NRTC is an additional piece.3 ' The GCA is Title I of the
National Firearms Act, signed into law in 1938 as a part of President Franklin
29. Cliff Stearns for Congress: The Issues-Second Amendment, http://cliffstearns.net/second-
amendment/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2013). Accord Press Release, Marlin Stutzman, Stutzman Introduces
Legislation to Protect Gun Owners, (Feb. 6, 2013), http://stutzman.house.gov/press.releases/184.
30. Press Release, Frank R. Lautenberg, Letter from Sen. Lautenberg and Rep. McCarthy to President
Obama (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.lautenberg.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=334725&.
31. See BRADY CAMP. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, MISSION STATEMENT,
http://www.bradycampaign.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2012).
32. See BRADY CAMP. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, NAT'L RIGHT-TO-CARRY RECIPROCITY ACT OF
2011 (H.R. 822): FACT SHEET (2011), available at http://www.bradycampaign.org/xshare/Legislation/201 I-
09_Fact_Sheet_on_HR_822_-_CCW_.ReciprocityFINAL.pdf (stating that the NRTC forces states to allow
concealed carrying based on out-of-state permits even though some states concealed carry licensing systems
endanger public safety by providing licenses to dangerous people who commit violent acts with firearms).
33. Cliff Steams, House Approves Stearns' Bill Enhancing Fundamental Right to Self-Defense, PROJECT
VOTE SMART (Nov. 16, 2011), http://votesmart.org/public-statement/652044/house-approves-stearns-bill-
enhancing-fundamental-right-to-self-defense (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
34. See Statement of Judiciary Committee Chairman Lamar Smith Full Committee Markup of H.R. 822,
the "National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of 2011," U.S. HOUSE OF REPS. COMM. ON THE JUD. (Oct. 13,
2011), http://judiciary.house.gov/news/Statement/20HR%20822.html (stating the NRTC requires states
currently permitting people to carry concealed firearms to recognize other states' valid concealed carry
permits is "much like [how] the states recognize drivers' licenses issued by other states").
35. See id.; see generally Respecting States' Rights and Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2013, H.R.
578, 113th Cong. (2013).
36. The Now is the Time proposal for universal background checks potentially provides greater federal
regulation of concealed carry, but as proposals, they are not law. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Roosevelt's federal firearms campaign." The GCA is less focused on who can
possess a gun and more concerned with the type of gun to be possessed." This
relegation of gun ownership and possession comports with the purpose of
Roosevelt's federal firearms campaign, which was to aid state and local efforts in
gun control by prohibiting firearm transactions that would violate state and local
laws. 9 To this end, legislators deleted during drafting a proposed nationwide
handgun registration provision and instead relied on state law to regulate that area
41
of gun control. Years later, bill supporters lamented that customers from states
41
requiring licenses could purchase guns in states without a requirement.
B. State Concealed Carry Regulation
Subject to the baseline federal regulation of the GCA, CHLs are administered
according to state law. States are loosely classified into four distinct categories
according to their respective concealed carry laws: (1) No-issue States ("state does
not permit residents or nonresidents to carry concealed handguns"); (2) May-issue
States ("state applies discretion in granting permits to carry concealed handguns");
(3) Shall-issue States ("issuing authorities are required to issue a permit to an
applicant that fulfills the objective statutory criteria if no statutory reason for denial
exists"); and (4) No-permit required ("states do not require a permit to carry a
42
concealed handgun").
While currently Illinois is the only No-issue State,43 along with the District of
Columbia, for those states which do issue CHLs, they retain varying levels of
discretion in issuing licenses. There are thirty-nine Shall-issue States, ten May-
issue States, and four No-permit required States. Within the ten May-issue States,
eligible individuals are subject to discretionary screening involving review of such
matters as an applicant's history and personal character as well as an applicant's
37. See generally National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841-5861 (2006); Federal Firearms Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 901-908 (1940) (repealed by Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, § 906, 82 Stat. 197 (1968)). President Roosevelt initiated the National Firearms Act of 1938 and the
Federal Firearms Act of 1938 as a part of his firearms control campaign during the 1930s. See infra note 39
and accompanying text.
38. While the GCA does generally prohibit certain classes of people from receiving or possessing a
firearm, such as persons less than eighteen years of age, the majority of provisions concern limitations on the
type of dangerous weapons individuals cannot own or possess, such as grenades and other weapons typically
reserved for military uses. See Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (2006).
39. See Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 133, 138 (1975). The jurisdiction for intrastate transactions under the National Firearms Act is based
on its regulatory powers on a tax imposed on the traffic of weapons. At the time of passage, the tax rate was
$200 per transfer. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 140.
42. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.
43. The Seventh Circuit has rejected Illinois' ban on issuing CHLs; however, the court stayed its ruling
for 180 days to permit Illinois to re-craft its law. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).
44. The total number of classified states adds to fifty-three because three states are concurrently
classified as a "No[-] permit required" and a "Shall-issue" state, namely Alaska, Arizona, and Wyoming. See
GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 8-9.
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asserted good cause for needing a permit.45 Similarly, sixteen of the thirty-nine
Shall-issue states preserve limited additional discretion to issue CHLs even in the
absence of a statutory reason for denial.46 Thus, even in states with statutory
requirements to issue CHLs, in practice those statutory requirements combine with
officials' discretion to manifest a licensure proceeding akin to May-issue states,
resulting in a more robust review process than the Shall-issue classification
otherwise suggests.47
Similar to state officials' varying levels of discretionary licensure proceedings,
states maintain a variety of statutory disqualifying factors that must be considered
before a CHL can be issued. Commonly shared disqualifying factors include: abuse
of controlled substances, conviction of a felony, mental deficiencies or psychiatric
disorders, and dishonorable discharge from the armed forces.48 Additionally, many
states maintain unique disqualifying laws, such as prohibiting issuance of CHLs to
individuals delinquent on their child support payments49 or payment of taxesso as
well as persons who are mentally or physically infirm" or chronic or habitual
alcoholics.52 If not pre-emptively disqualified from CHL eligibility, some common
statewide qualifying requirements include firearms safety training and a twenty-one
minimum age requirement.
Disqualifying and qualifying CHL laws reflect the interests of citizens and the
laws their state representatives pass, and in that vein, form the basis of states'
reciprocal recognition of out-of-state CHLs. Thirty-nine of the forty-eight CHL-
issuing states, including Vermont,54 selectively recognize permits from other states
based on state statutory law." The criteria states consider for reciprocal recognition
are wide-ranging; some states only recognize another state's CHLs if that other
state recognizes their CHLs or maintains proper criminal and firearm registration
56databases. Moreover, states maintain different laws concerning when CHLs must
be provided to law enforcement officials and how CHLs must be physically
45. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 12-13. For example, in California, officials discretionarily
consider whether the applicant is of good moral character and has put forth a sufficiently good reason for
requiring a handgun. See id. at 13; see also Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 101 (2d Cir.
2012) (holding consistent with the Second Amendment New York law requiring a concealed carry permit
applicant to demonstrate proper cause to obtain a license).
46. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 12. For example, Virginia can discretionarily deny individuals if
courts conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed licensee likely will use the weapon
unlawfully or negligently in harm of others. See id. at 13.
47. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 943 (Williams, J., dissenting) (noting New York as an example).
48. Such states include but are not limited to the following: Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 17.
49. Such states include but are not limited to the following: California, Tennessee, and Texas. See id.
50. Such states include but are not limited to the following: California and Texas. See id.
51. Such states include but are not limited to the following: Florida, Louisiana, and Tennessee. See id.
52. Such states include but are not limited to the following: Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland,
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. See id.
53. See id. at 17-28.
54. Vermont neither requires CHLs nor issues CHLs. See id. at 19, n.32.
55. See id. at 19.
56. See, e.g., TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 411.173(b) (West 2005) (Texas will only recognize out-of-state
permits issued in states that conduct background checks).
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manufactured; for example, Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Tennessee, Virginia, and
Texas require all CHL holders to produce the permit when law enforcement
requests it, while California, Maryland, and Georgia do not." Consequently, these
inconsistencies between states force a majority of those states issuing CHLs to
grant some level of law enforcement reciprocity whereby various local agencies
work cross-border with other states' registration databases and license-issuing
offices to verify proper CHL holders. 8
III. THE PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM WITHIN
COMMERCE CLAUSE & SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. Commerce Clause
Congress passed the NRTC pursuant to its power under the Commerce
Clause." The Commerce Clause grants authority to Congress "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes;"o however, such regulatory power over the states and their citizens has not
been and continues not to be unlimited. While Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Airport sets forth the governing standard of review for federalism cases, the
Supreme Court has since refined that once deferential review of federal regulation
61
allegedly infringing on state prerogatives.
1. Refinement #1: Traditional State Functions
a. Birth of Governing Standard ofReview in Federalism Cases: From National
League of Cities v. Usery to Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Airport
At one time, the judiciary limited the power of the Commerce Clause by
immunizing from it those activities it classified as traditional state functions. In
National League of Cities v. Usery,62 the Court considered whether Congress'
extension of federal wage and hour laws to almost all public employees of states
involved "functions essential to separate and independent existence ... so that
Congress may not abrogatethe States' otherwise plenary authority to make them.""
Then-Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, answered in the affirmative,6
57. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 29-30. In the event a CHL is provided to law enforcement, most
states require name, birthdate, and expiration date of permit, but only some require a state seal, photograph,
race and sex classification, and signature. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 30.
58. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 31.
59. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
60. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824) ("[T]he
power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all
others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.").
61. See infra Parts III.A.I.ii., III.A.2, and III.A.3.
62. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
63. Id. at 845-46 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. See id. at 845 ("We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to
every state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an
344 [Vol. 39:2
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citing fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, and public health as examples of
services typically provided by the state." In reviewing the federal wage and hour
requirements in light of those customary state functions, the Court emphasized that
the increased cost on the state government impermissibly interfered with state
delivery of public services." Accordingly, the Court held that the federal
displacement of "the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions [was] not within the authority granted Congress
by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.""
Writing for the dissent, Justice Brennan disagreed with the Usery majority's
protection of traditional state functions." The dissent suggested that the safeguard
of federalism was not found in judicial determinations on what constitutes a
traditional state function but inherent in constitutional structure, asserting that
"there is no restraint based on state sovereignty requiring or permitting judicial
enforcement anywhere expressed in the Constitution,"" and that "the political
branches of our Government are structured to protect the interests of the States, as
well as the Nation as a whole, and that the States are fully able to protect their own
interests in the premises."70
Less than a decade after the Supreme Court's decision in Usery, the Court
vindicated Justice Brennan and his fellow Usery dissenters in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority," wherein the Court rejected a Commerce
Clause carve-out for traditional state functions.72 Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority in another challenge to the extension of federal wage law to state officials,
concluded that Usery "inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make
decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes."" The
Court set forth the new governing standard for reviewing federalism challenges
under national legislation:
[T]he fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on
the Commerce Clause to protect the 'States as States' is one of process
rather than one of result. Any substantive restraint on the exercise of
Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural
nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for
affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from
exercising the authority in that manner.").
65. See id. at 851.
66. See id. at 847 ("[T]he Act [extending federal wage law to state workers] displaces state policies
regarding the manner in which [states] will structure delivery of those governmental services.").
67. Id. at 852.
68. Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens joined the dissent. See id. at 856.
69. Id. at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 876 (emphasis added).
71. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
72. See id. at 546-47 ("We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a
rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular
governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional."').
73. Id. at 546.
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possible failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a
"sacred province of state autonomy."7 4
Inasmuch, the Court found that equal state representation in the Senate, state
control of voter qualifications, and state participation in the Electoral College
exemplified political safeguards of federalism, that is, those structural elements of
the Constitution dividing and providing power between and within state and federal
governments.75  Moving forward, the Court would not vigorously review Tenth
Amendment claims unless a component of the political process of states' citizens'
election of their federal representatives could not function properly.
Justice Powell disagreed with the majority in Garcia, faulting the Court for its
failure to follow the precedent set in Usery and the fallacious rationale underlying
its decision.7 1 In his dissent, Powell responded to the majority's adoption of the
political safeguards theory by succinctly noting the unfounded assumption that
members of Congress will retain their state's interest while serving the federal
77government. Further, Powell found that the Court disregarded the role of the
Tenth Amendment in ensuring state integrity and ignored how fire prevention,
police protection, and public health, as noted in Usery, "epitomize[d] the concerns
of local, democratic self-government," which states "are better able than the
National Government to perform." Powell concluded that federal overreaching
under the Commerce Clause undermines the constitutional balance of power
between the States and the Federal Government, "a balance designed to protect our
fundamental liberties."
74. Id. at 554 (emphasis added) (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983)).
75. See id. at 550-51 ("It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Government was
designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress. The Framers thus gave the States
a role in the selection both of the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government. The
States were vested with indirect influence over the House of Representatives and the Presidency by their
control of electoral qualifications and their role in Presidential elections. They were given more direct
influence in the Senate, where each State received equal representation and each Senator was to be selected by
the legislature of his State. The significance attached to the States' equal representation in the Senate is
underscored by the prohibition of any constitutional amendment divesting a State of equal representation
without the State's consent." (Citations omitted)).
76. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor also dissented in separate opinions. See id. at 579 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 580 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77. See id. at 564-65 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role in
the electoral process guarantees that particular exercises of the Commerce Clause power will not infringe on
residual state sovereignty. Members of Congress are elected from the various States, but once in office they
are Members of the Federal Government. Although the States participate in the Electoral College, this is
hardly a reason to view the President as a representative of the States' interest against federal encroachment."
(Footnotes omitted)).
78. Id. at 574-76 (footnote omitted) (citing Usery, 426 U.S. at 851).
79. Id. at 572.
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b. Return to the Traditional State Functions Standard: Lopez v. United States,
United States v. Morrison, and National Federation ofIndependent Business v.
Sebelius
Although Garcia foreclosed judicial attempts to discern what is traditional,
integral, or necessary to local governmental functions, in recent years the Supreme
Court, in Lopez v. United States" and United States v. Morrison,8 ' has structured
the outer limits of Congress' Commerce Clause power by ensuring Congress'
regulatory power over interstate commerce does not eviscerate the distinction
between "what is truly national and what is truly local."82 In Lopez, the Court
considered the constitutionality of Congress's enactment of the Gun Free School
Zones Act ("GFSZ"), which prohibited the knowing possession of firearms within a
school zone." Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held the GFSZ
exceeded Commerce Clause authority.84 Although the political safeguards theory
would dictate otherwise, the Court considered the traditional role of the state police
function, concluding, "To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would
have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of
the sort retained by the States."" Similarly in Morrison, Rehnquist, again writing
for the majority, explicitly reaffirmed that Congress' use of the Commerce Clause
cannot "obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and local
authority."" In considering the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"), the
Court reaffirmed the protection against federal infringement upon a state's
traditional police power." Even in the face of Garcia, both Lopez and Morrison
distinguish between national and local activity, specifically utilizing the state police
function to underscore that distinction.
Even though the Supreme Court seemingly resurrected traditional state
functions in Lopez, the dissenters in Lopez did not counter that consideration,
instead waiting until Morrison to address the repudiation of traditional state
80. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
81. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
82. Id. at 617-18 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68).
83. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (citation omitted).
84. See id. (holding the GFSZ was an unconstitutional exercise of Commerce Clause power because it
neither regulated a commercial activity nor contained a requirement that the gun possession be connected to
interstate commerce).
85. Id. at 567. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy acknowledged some validity in the general claim that
the balance between national and state power is entrusted in its entirety to the political process but ultimately
rejected this idea by re-characterizing Garcia, asserting "the federal balance is too essential a part of our
constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene
when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far." Id. at 577-78 (Kennedy, J.
concurring); see also, id. at 584 (Thomas, J. concurring) (emphasis in original) ("We always have rejected
readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that would permit Congress to exercise a
police power; our cases are quite clear that there are real limits to federal power."').
86. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
87. See id. (holding that the suppression of violent crime has always been the prime objective of states'
police power and fearing that regulating violence in the aggregate could be applied to other areas of traditional
state function).
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81functions as set forth in Garcia. In Morrison, Justice Souter stated on behalf of
the dissent:
The objection to reviving traditional state spheres of action as a
consideration in commerce clause analysis . . . not only rests on the
portent of incoherence, but is compounded by a further defect just as
fundamental. The defect, in essence, is the majority's rejection of the
Founders' considered judgment that politics, not judicial review, should
mediate between state and national interests ....
... Congress, not the courts, must remain primarily responsible for
striking the appropriate state/federal balance.... Congress is
institutionally motivated to do so. Its Members represent state and local
district interests. They consider the views of state and local officials
when they legislate, and they have even developed formal procedures to
ensure that such consideration takes place. Moreover, Congress often
can better reflect state concerns for autonomy in the details of
sophisticated statutory schemes than can the Judiciary .... .
In rejecting the Court's revival of the traditional state functions test in Lopez
and Morrison, the Morrison dissent relied on the governing Garcia standard to
confirm that federalism is protected through political process and popular
representation of states in the federal government; the dissent found that the
majority improperly placed the local over the national instead of deferring to the
political process as a safeguard of local interests.
The Supreme Court's revival of the traditional state functions test put forth in
Usery confirms that the promise of federalism is its protection of individual
liberty.90 As most recently reaffirmed in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius,9 the Court stated, "By denying any one government complete
jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the
individual from arbitrary power."92 The diffusion of power between state police
and the federal government ensures the safeguarding of individual liberties, upon
which more local governments should promote and be held accountable rather than
the federal government. 93 By relying on the state police function to distinguish
88. Although the Lopez dissenters-Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg-based their
disagreement in that opinion on the rational basis standard of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Justice
Souter's individual dissent briefly noted that he believed the Commerce Clause power was plenary and any
consideration of "customary state concerns" had been "flatly rejected." Lopez, 514 U.S.at 609.
89. Morrison, 529 U.S.at 647, 660- 61 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
90. See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text.
91. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
92. Id. at 2578 (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011)).
93. See id. ("The Framers thus ensured that powers which 'in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties, and properties of the people' were held by governments more local and more accountable than
a distant federal bureaucracy." (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293 (James Madison))).
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between national and local activity, the Court resurrects and reinforces structural
considerations of constitutional allocations of power in two sovereigns-the State
and the Union.
2. Refinement #2: Clear Statement Rule
Even when Congress permissibly regulates in areas traditionally reserved for
states under Garcia by implicitly relying on the political process to ensure proper
protection of federalism, Congress must be clear and cannot be ambiguous as to the
scope of such regulation. In Gregory v. Ashcroft,94 the Supreme Court confronted
the issue of whether Missouri's state-mandated retirement age of seventy for state
judges violated federal age discrimination law.95 Writing for the majority, Justice
O'Connor stated, "[I]nasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the
political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress'
Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended
such an exercise."9 Although the federal law prohibits employers, including "a
State or political subdivision thereof,"97 from discharging employees because of
their age, the Court held that it would not read the law "to cover state judges unless
Congress has made it clear that judges are included."' Because the federal age
discrimination law did not explicitly state that the judges were employees of the
state, the Court declared that such regulatory ambiguity precluded it from
attributing to Congress "an intent to intrude on state government functions."99
In his dissent, Justice White accused O'Connor of contravening the holding in
Garcia; however, White's Garcia-based dissent is misguided in that, by adopting a
clear statement rule, Justice O'Connor merely ensures Garcia is applied
effectively.'00 Similar to the Lopez-Morrison-Sebelius line of Commerce Clause
cases, O'Connor is making a structural argument. Nowhere in the text of the
Commerce Clause does it require Congress to be clear as to its regulations over
states;o'0 nevertheless, the nature of dual sovereignty requires federal legislators to
consider the potential impact of any federal regulation because:
94. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
95. See id. at 455 (citing Mo. CONST. art. V, § 26; Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub.
L. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006))).
96. Id. at 464.
97. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2006).
98. Id. at 467 (first emphasis added). O'Connor went on to say, "[I]t must be plain to anyone reading the
Act that it covers judges." Id.
99. Id. at 470.
100. See id. at 477 (White, J., dissenting); see also id. at 479 ("As long as 'the national political process
did not operate in a defective manner, the Tenth Amendment is not implicated." (emphasis in original)
(quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 513 (1988))). White concluded that there was no indication
that the procedural passage of the ADEA inadequately protected the States from undue federal burden. See id.
("There is no claim in this case that the political process by which the ADEA was extended to state employees
was inadequate to protect the States from being 'unduly burden[ed]' by the Federal Government." (quoting
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556)).
101. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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'The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. ... The powers reserved to the several
States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State."10 2
In acknowledging Garcia's rejection of Usery's traditional state functions test and
relying upon the political structure as the sole safeguard to federalism, which in
turn is the safeguard of individual liberties, O'Connor establishes a simple qualifier:
Congress must be clear during the political process when that process imposes a
burden on the states, because such clarity ensures the electorate of an honest and
thorough record upon which to consider when holding elected representatives
accountable for those decisions made on behalf of the state and its citizens and
affecting their individual liberties.
3. Refinement #3: Anti-commandeering Principles
Even if Congress regulates clearly under Gregory, the law cannot compel states
to enact regulatory programs serving federal policies. In New York v. United
States'l3 and Printz v. United States,'"0 as well as Sebelius, the Supreme Court
rejected the federal government's position that, under the respective Commerce
Clause regulations, the United States could compel state legislatures or mandate
state executives to enforce federal regulatory programs.1os In New York, the Court
confronted the national problem of radioactive waste disposal and Congress'
coercion of states to either follow federal mandates on radioactive waste or take
title to the waste within their borders. 06  Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
rejected congressional compulsion upon states because it insulates federal
legislators from the political accountability necessary to safeguard federalism:
Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling it,
state governments remain responsive to the local electorate's preferences;
state officials remain accountable to the people.
By contrast, where the Federal Government compels States to
regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is
diminished.... [W]here the Federal Government directs the States
to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of
102. Gregory, 571 U.S. at 458 (emphasis added) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James
Madison)).
103. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
104. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
105. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) ("[T]he Federal Government may not compel
the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs."); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) ("We have always understood that even where Congress has the
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly
to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts." (citations omitted)).
106. See New York, 505 U.S. at 149, 153-54.
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public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the
regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus diminished
when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate
in accordance with the views of the local electorate in matters not
pre-empted by federal regulation.'or
In Printz v. United States, the Court faced Congress' temporary GCA mandate that
state police enforce federal gun registration protocols."o Justice Scalia's majority
opinion extended O'Connor's New York reasoning to states' executive branches,
highlighting that federally mandated regulatory schemes carried out by state
executives can misallocate benefits to the federal government and burdens to the
states:
By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of
implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can
take credit for 'solving' problems without having to ask their constituents
to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. And even when States
are not forced to absorb the costs of implementing a federal program,
they are still put in the position of taking the blame for its
burdensomeness and for its defects.'09
Structurally, New York and Printz emphasize that the federal government enacts
laws on people, not states, and the dual-sovereignty of federalism protects sweeping
legislation from offending individual liberties.'
The issue of large bureaucratic compulsion offensive to individual liberties also
arose in Sebelius, wherein the Court rejected economic compulsion. Congress
could not hold a "gun to the head" of states to comply with the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act."' By aggrandizing itself and creating a vast national
bureaucracy, the federal government left states with no option but to adopt the
federal government's Medicaid expansion or lose Medicaid funding." 2 This
107. Id. at 168-69.
108. Printz, 521 U.S. at 902.
109. Id. at 930.
110. See id. at 921 (suggesting the separation between the States and the Federal Government is one of the
"structural protections of liberty" that "'will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front"' (quoting
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458)); New York, 505 U.S. at 181 ("[T]he Constitution divides authority between federal
and state governments for the protection of individuals.").
11l. Nat'1 Fed n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604-07 (2012) (holding Congress cannot
compel States into compliance with the Patient Protections and Affordable Care Act by threatening
withdrawal of federal Medicaid funding).
112. See id. at 2604-06. In New York, Justice White wrote in dissent, "The ultimate irony of the decision
today is that in its formalistically rigid obeisance to 'federalism,' the Court gives Congress fewer incentives to
defer to the wishes of state officials in achieving local solutions to local problems." New York, 505 U.S. at
210 (White, J., dissenting). White believed the majority's holding prevented Congress from forcing a
recalcitrant New York into abiding by its compromise with other States to reduce low-level radioactive waste.
See id. In his Printz dissent, Justice Stevens echoed Justice White, arguing, "Perversely, the majority's rule
seems more likely to damage than to preserve the safeguards against tyranny provided by the existence of
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prohibition against "economic dragooning""' reinforced the anti-commandeering
principles established in New York and Printz, namely that the federal government
cannot commandeer state bodies by indirectly coercing or directly requiring them to
employ federal mandates, as it interferes with federalism's structural safeguard of
political accountability." 4
B. Second Amendment
The NRTC's stated purpose is to secure the individual right protected under the
Second Amendment as recognized in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald
v. City of Chicago."' Heller and McDonald were the first Supreme Court cases,
separated by only two years, to interpret the substantive rights contained in the
Second Amendment, which provides that "[a] well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
arms, shall not be infringed.""'
1. The Second Amendment is an Individual Right: District of Columbia v. Heller
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of
the Second Amendment as securing an individual right to maintain a handgun in the
home for safety." 7 The District of Columbia's ("DC") firearms statute prohibited
the registration of handguns and declared it a crime to carry any unregistered
firearm."' Heller was a DC special police officer who challenged DC's rejection of
his handgun registration application for a handgun he wished to keep at home." 9
Justice Scalia's majority opinion concluded the right to keep and bear arms was an
individual right unrelated to service in the armed forces or a collective right that
applied only to state-regulated armed forces. 20 After concluding the right to keep
vital state governments.... [Because] the Court creates incentives for the National Government to aggrandize
itself." Printz, 512 U.S. at 959 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (finding the threatened loss of over ten percent of a state's budget is
economic dragooning that leaves the states with no option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion
provision).
114. See id. at 2602-03.
115. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595
(2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010); cf Respecting States' Rights and
Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2013, H.R. 578, 113th Cong. (2013) (securing rights of CHL holders to
possess and carry handguns in other states).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. 11.
117. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (holding the Second Amendment protects "the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home").
118. See D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (West 2001). The Court did not
address the District of Columbia's licensing requirement. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 631 ("We .. assume that
petitioners' issuance of a license will satisfy respondent's prayer for relief and do not address the licensing
requirement.").
119. Heller, 554 U.S. at 575.
120. See id. at 595 ("There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second
Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.").
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and bear arms was an individual right, the majority found that the DC handgun ban
unconstitutionally impeded that right.12 1
After holding the Second Amendment protected an individual right, the Court
separately addressed the scope of the defined right. The Court specifically defined
the individual right at issue as including protection for "handguns held and used for
self-defense in the home." 2  The Court emphasized that the Second Amendment
right is "not unlimited;" Scalia stated that the right to bear arms "was not a right to
keep and carry any weapons whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for
whatever purpose."' 23 Indeed, the Court specifically noted that its opinion did not
call into question "the majority of the 19th-century courts" holdings "that
prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second
Amendment or state analogues;"I24 the Court confirmed that such regulations are
presumptively lawful. Furthermore, the Court set the governing standard moving
forward: "[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood
to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes)
even future judges think that scope too broad."' 26 In response to Justice Breyer's
dissent calling for the Court to conduct an "interest-balancing" test focusing on
"practicalities, the statute's rationale, the problems that called it into being, and its
relation to those objectives,"' 27 Scalia retorted that the Second Amendment "is the
very product of an interest balancing by the people."l2 The Court purposely did not
rule against state-based prohibitory laws because the history of the Second
Amendment necessarily included state citizen involvement in shaping the contours
of the Second Amendment right.
2. Incorporation of the Second Amendment: McDonald v. City of Chicago
Under similar facts as Heller, the Court confronted in McDonald v. City of
Chicago the City of Chicago's effective ban on handguns and asked whether the
protected right divined in Heller could be applied, that is incorporated, against the
121. See id. at 628-30. Justice Scalia did not address any standard of review for Second Amendment
claims because the DC laws preventing guns for self-defense "of one's home and family" were
unconstitutional "under any of the standards of scrutiny the Court has applied to enumerated constitutional
rights." Id. at 628.
122. Id. at 628. Justice Scalia found that the DC handgun ban amounted to prohibitions on an entire class
of "arms" that Americans "overwhelmingly" use for the lawful purpose of self-defense in the home "where
the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute." Id.
123. Id. at 626.
124. Id. at 626-27 (emphasis added). This is not the first time the Supreme Court has claimed that
prohibitions on concealed carry comport with the Second Amendment. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S.
275, 281-82 (1897) (stating in dicta that the Second Amendment "is not infringed by laws prohibiting the
carrying concealed weapons"). Heller also did not "cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession
of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such
as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale
of arms." Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
125. See Heller, 544 U.S. at 627 n.26 ("We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only
as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.").
126. Id. at 634-35.
127. Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 635 (second emphasis added).
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states.129 Justice Alito, joined by Scalia, Kennedy, and Rehnquist for the plurality
opinion, concluded in the affirmative. The plurality ruled that Heller dictated the
conclusion that the "right to keep and bear arms is fundamental to our ordered
scheme of liberty," the standard for determining whether an amendment in the Bill
of Rights should be incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment.' In
reaching this conclusion, the plurality acknowledged incorporation does limit the
"legislative freedom of States," but rejected the City's argument that the Court
should depart from its incorporation methodology on the grounds that enforcing the
Second Amendment against states is inconsistent with principles of federalism."'
Alito appealed to history-that the selective incorporation approach had been
adopted to safeguard the values of federalism and state experimentation-and
reality-that thirty eight States appearing as amici affirmed they would continue to
experiment with firearms law."3 The plurality reaffirmed that it was not casting
doubt on states' longstanding prerogative to craft and enforce handgun regulation."'
The dissent did not disagree with the plurality; Justices Stevens and Breyer
similarly appealed to principles of federalism,134 specifically highlighting the
integral role of state and local governments in policing the Second Amendment."'
In this regard, both the plurality and dissent agree that states and their citizens are
an integral component in shaping Second Amendment rights.
The disagreements in Heller and McDonald are reminiscent of the structural
considerations addressed in the Lopez-Morrison-Sebelius line of Commerce Clause
cases concerning state functions and national policy, but unlike Lopez, Morrison,
129. The Chicago law prohibited a person from possessing any firearm "unless such person is the holder
of a valid registration certificate for such firearm," but because the code prohibited registration of most
handguns, the ordinance effectively banned handgun possession by almost all city residents. See McDonald,
130 S. Ct. at 3026 (2010).
130. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (plurality opinion).
131. See id. at 3045-46 (rejecting Chicago's claim that making the Second Amendment binding on the
states and subdivisions violates the principles of federalism and will stifle states' experimentation with
firearm law).
132. Id. at 3046 ("State and local experimentation with reasonable firearms regulations will continue
under the Second Amendment.").
133. See id. at 3047. The Court ultimately did not rule on the constitutionality of Chicago's gun
regulations, instead reversing and remanding the case for further proceedings. Id. at 3050.
134. Consequently, the question arises whether the Stevens and Breyer dissents can be reconciled with
their rejection of traditional state functions in prior cases, such as Lopez and Morrison. Justice Stevens
attempts to answer that question: "[e]lementary considerations of constitutional text and structure suggest
there may be legitimate reasons to hold state governments to different standards than the Federal Government
in certain areas." McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3093 (emphasis added).
135. Justice Stevens wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment "did not unstitch the basic federalist pattern
woven into our constitutional fabric." McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3093. Similarly, Breyer wrote, "[s]tates and
local communities have historically differed about the need for gun regulation as well as about its proper level
[and it is not] surprising that 'primarily, and historically,' the law has treated the exercise of police powers,
including gun control, as 'matter[s] of local concern."' Id. at 3128-29. The distinction Stevens and Breyer
draw between state and national governments and their significance in adjudicating Commerce Clause and
Incorporation actions, however tenuous one might consider it, rings of the fundamental concern Justice
Powell raised in his Garcia dissent-that the political safeguards of federalism ignore the important role of
state governments in crafting state prerogative. Stevens seems to accept this much, finding "[i]f a particular
liberty interest is already being given careful consideration in, and subjected to ongoing calibration by, the
States, judicial enforcement may not be appropriate." Heller, 130 S. Ct. at 3101.
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and Sebelius, both the majorities and dissents in Heller and McDonald rely on
constitutional structure to support their opinions invoking traditional state
practice.13 In both Heller and McDonald, the majority, plurality, and dissent
disputed not the existence of the tradition of state regulation of gun control, but
rather the scope and impact that tradition had and has in shaping the contours of the
Second Amendment. Although Justice Scalia's Heller opinion did not exhaustively
analyze the full scope and history of the Second Amendment, it did find an
individual right of handguns inside the home for protection, to which Justice
Stevens confirmed and countered, "[A] conclusion that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right does not tell us anything about the scope of that right."
In McDonald, Stevens and Breyer both countered Alito's analysis on the scope
of the right incorporated, speaking of the tradition of formidable state gun
regulation.' Therefore, nearly the entire Supreme Court agrees in the context of
liberty interests deriving from the Second Amendment, the individual right at issue
is shaped necessarily according to the historically popular and personal judgments
of the citizens of states, as expressed through state legislatures and enforced
through state executives.
3. Circuit Court Split on application of McDonald and Heller to CHLs
In wake of the Supreme Court's McDonald decision to remand consideration of
whether the City of Chicago's handgun registration ban was constitutional, Chicago
amended its firearms law to prohibit the carrying of a concealed gun in public,
eliminating the general handgun ban as applied within the home.' This law,
though, did not end the legal challenges to Chicago's strict gun control measures.
In Moore v. Madigan,140 the Seventh Circuit addressed whether the Second
Amendment right to use arms within the house for safety could be extended to
protect the right of self-defense outside of the home.14 1 The Seventh Circuit, in a 2-
1 split decision, interpreted the right "to bear" arms implies a right "to carry a
loaded gun outside the home," and in so. doing, readily dispensed with the
controlling Heller standard to engage in a historical review of whether founding-era
America recognized such a right.142 The court summarily concluded, "[t]he
136. See supra notes 115-35 and accompanying text.
137. Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. Justice Stevens stated, "[The] Constitution still envisions a system of divided sovereignty, still
'establishes a federal republic where local differences are to be cherished as elements of liberty' in the vast
run of cases, still allocates a general 'police power ... to the States and the States alone."' See McDonald,
130 S. Ct. at 3093 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (quoting Nat'l Rifle Assn. of Am. Inc. v. Chicago, 567 F.3d 856,
860 (7th Cir. 2009)); United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010)). Justice Breyer echoed this
concern by stating that the ability of States to reflect local preferences and conditions are "key virtues of
federalism." Id. at 3128 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
139. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-2 (West 2008); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1(a)(4), (10),-1.6(a)
(West 2008); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT, 5/24-l(a)(4)(iii), (10)(iii), -1.6(a)(3)(B) (West 2008).
140. 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
141. See generally id.
142. See id. at 934, 942 (discussing briefly the need for handguns in public for self-defense in the plains
territory where skirmishes with Native Americans occurred but admitting a disinclination "to engage in
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Supreme Court has decided that the amendment confers a right to bear arms for
self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside."' 43
The sole dissenter, Judge Ann Williams, repudiated the majority for failing to
engage in the historical analysis required by Heller.'44 In suggesting that it was
unclear whether founding-era America recognized a right to carry guns in public for
self-defense, 14 Williams recognized that such historical uncertainty permitted
Illinois to craft domestic gun law otherwise consistent with Heller. 14 Williams
acknowledged principles of federalism mandated that Illinois follow the wishes of
its citizens pertaining to gun law, as those wishes comport with the liberty interest
enshrined in the Second Amendment.147
Like Judge Williams in Moore, a three-judge panel of the Tenth Circuit in
Peterson v. Martinezl4 8 engaged in the proper historical analysis and unanimously
concluded that the Second Amendment does not confer a right to carry a concealed
handgun.149  The Colorado law at issue restricts issuance of in-state CHLs and
recognition of out-of-state CHLs; Colorado law limits issuance of Colorado CHLs
to state residents and reciprocally recognizes out-of-state CHLs only from
individuals who are residents of the CHL-issuing state.'s Peterson claimed that
these laws created a "licensing scheme" that violated the Second Amendment by
"prohibiting any meaningful opportunity" for him to carry a handgun in Denver, a
city he frequently visited."' After noting the Supreme Court has provided little
guidance on the standard of review governing state restrictions on the possession of
firearms other than some level of historical review,15 the court rejected Peterson's
Second Amendment claims by relying on dicta from Robertson v. Baldwin, wherein
another round of historical analysis to determine whether eighteenth-century America understood the Second
Amendment to include a right to bear guns outside the home").
143. See id. at 942.
144. See id. (Williams, J. dissenting) ("I do not agree that the Supreme Court in Heller rejected the
argument that the State makes here, nor do I think the State's argument effectively asks us to repudiate
Heller's historical analysis... . It is less clear to me ... that a widely understood right to carry ready-to-use
arms in public for potential self-defense existed at the time of the founding.").
145. See id. at 946 ("So while there are a variety of sources and authorities, the ones I have discussed
suggest that there was not a clear historical consensus that persons could carry guns in public for self-
defense.").
146. See id. at 949 (quoting Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 2012)) ("In the
context of firearm regulation, the legislature is far better equipped than the judiciary to make sensitive policy
judgments (within constitutional limits) concerning the dangers in carrying firearms and the manner to combat
those risks.").
147. See id. at 953 ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.") (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932); id. at 944
(rejecting argument by dissenters and stating, "[t]hat simply does not comport with our longstanding view that
the Bill of Rights codified venerable, widely understood liberties").
148. 606 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2013).
149. See Peterson, 606 F.3d at 1208-12 (10th Cir. 2013).
150. See id. at 1209.
151. See id. at 1203.
152. See id. at 1207-08 (stating that although Heller does not provide a standard by which to review
restrictions on firearms possession, Tenth Circuit precedent has derived from Heller an inquiry into whether
the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment
historically guaranteed).
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the Supreme Court stated that the Second Amendment "is not infringed by laws
prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons,"' and conducting an independent
historical analysis, finding that scholars, as the Court did in Heller, recognize a
"long history" of concealed handgun restrictions in the United States.154
Accordingly, instead of disregarding the historical analysis required by and
acknowledged in Heller, the Tenth Circuit relied on prior historical analysis and
even engaged in its own review to find no Second Amendment protection for
concealed carry.
In addition to Peterson, Moore is anomalous in light of the other CHL cases
applying Heller, including Hightower v. City of Boston15 ' and Kachalsky v. Cnty. of
Westchester."' In Hightower, the First Circuit applied Heller to hold the City of
Boston may regulate gun licensure procedures to preclude the carrying of concealed
weapons outside of the home by those falsifying their CHL applications.
Similarly, in Kachalsky the Second Circuit held New York's good-cause
prerequisite to obtaining a CHL to carry a handgun in public was consistent with
the Second Amendment after finding an inconsistent history as to public possession
of handguns.15 1 Presumably, had the Seventh Circuit performed adequate historical
review of carriage of guns in public, it would have adopted the historical findings of
its sister circuit precedents in Hightower and Kachalsky and applied Heller more
narrowly to find that the scope of Second Amendment liberty interests is shaped
according to states' autonomous representation of its citizens' interests.15
IV. TRADITIONAL STATE POLICE FUNCTION & WANT FOR POLITICAL
SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM IN THE NRTC
To the extent the Supreme Court has revived Usery's traditional state functions
immunity as a constraint on the scope of Commerce Clause power, the NRTC is
outside the scope of Commerce Clause power because it unconstitutionally
regulates the traditional state police function."o Yet, even if the traditional state
functions test has not been revived and the political safeguards theory enunciated in
Garcia governs, the NRTC remains unconstitutional-it violates the Clear
Statement and Anti-commandeering principles of the Tenth Amendment by
deconstructing the political procedures necessary to ensure that citizens' Second
153. See id. at 1210 (citing Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897)).
154. See id. at 1211. The court also rejected Peterson's challenge to the law under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause on primarily the same grounds as the Second Amendment issue. See id. at 1212.
155. 693 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012).
156. 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012).
157. See Hightower, 693 F.3d at 73 (interpreting Heller as providing presumptive legality to local laws
prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons).
158. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91 (stating that unlike the ban on handguns in the home protected in
Heller, history and tradition did not "speak with one voice" concerning the scope of right to bear arms in
public and that history demonstrated states often disagreed as to the scope of the right to bear arms in public).
159. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (warning against treating
Heller as "containing broader holdings than the Court set out to establish: that the Second Amendment creates
individual rights, one of which is keeping operable handguns at home for self-defense").
160. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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Amendment liberty interests, as measured by and through the states, remain
protected. 6 1
A. The NRTC Exceeds Commerce Clause Authority
Issuing gun licenses and policing those licenses has and continues to be a
traditional state function. Indeed, the Lopez Court, drawing influence from Justice
Powell's dissent in Garcia, finds that enforcing a prohibition on gun possession
near schools exemplifies the police function reserved to the states.16 Similarly, the
majority, plurality, and dissenting opinions in Heller and McDonald extend the
broad purpose and legislative methods for promoting state police power as to gun
ownership generally; by relying on history first, to recognize a private right to keep
and bear arms in Heller, and second, to incorporate that right against the states as a
fundamental right necessary for ordered liberty in McDonald, the Court confirms
states' historic and continued role in regulating gun ownership and possession.
The NRTC implicitly recognizes the right of states to police the safety, health, and
welfare of their citizens with respect to lawful gun ownership and possession
because the Act only allows persons with valid state-issued CHLs to carry a
concealed firearm in those states that also issue such permits or do not prohibit the
carrying of concealed firearms. The NRTC's provisions permitting state laws to
govern the manner of concealed gun possession creates a false dichotomy between
ownership and possession because it assumes ownership and possession are not
both subject to the policing judgments as to the health, safety, and welfare of
citizens.I" Thus, notwithstanding a contrary suggestion in Moore, a contrived
separation between lawful licensure to own a gun and the associated possessory
rights impermissibly deprives states of their traditional function to police the
collective health, safety, and welfare covering all aspects of personally concealed
firearms within their borders. 66
Because the NRTC nationally mandates state recognition of another state's
CHLs, it directly impairs not just states' traditional function of policing the
licensure of concealed firearms, which under Lopez, Morrison, and Sebelius, cannot
be impaired at the expense of national regulation under the Commerce Clause, but
also the scheme of liberty which, although enforceable against the states, is molded
according to states' traditional police function. The NRTC simply ignores the
161. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
162. See supra notes 76-79, 83-85 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
618 (2000) (finding the suppression of violent crimes has always been the prime object of states' police
power).
164. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
165. The objective of state police power is to "allow government to establish rules of good conduct and
good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights and to insure to each the uninterrupted
enjoyment of corresponding enjoyment by others." David Kopel & Glenn Reynolds, The Evolving Police
Power: Some Observations for a New Century, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511, 516 (2000). In furtherance of
that objective, "[sitate legislatures and local governments have a police power to enact laws for the benefit of
public safety, health, welfare, and even morality." Id. at 528.
166. See generally Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).
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purpose and function of a dual federalist system to ensure personal liberty is
protected from federal interference. The Supreme Court recognized in Heller and
McDonald the integral role states have had and will continue to have in shaping the
scope of Second Amendment rights on behalf of its citizens, and it is that
traditionally local function that the Commerce Clause cannot regulate.1
B. The NRTC Neuters the Political Safeguards ofFederalism
To the extent a law is presumed proper under the Commerce Clause, post-
Garcia reliance on the country's political structure to safeguard federalism is only
deferential to congressional directives insofar as the political processes function
properly. The NRTC is unconstitutional even under Justice Blackmun's political
safeguards standard set forth in Garcia because federally mandating states to
recognize and enforce other states' CHL eligibility requirements unclearly confuses
voters as to the nature of the Second Amendment rights at issue and, even if clear,
inappropriately forces states into a federal regulatory scheme structurally incapable
of responsively crafting substantive CHL eligibility laws representative of local
electorates' wishes.
1. The NRTC Violates the Clear Statement Rule
The NRTC is unclear as to the nature of protection it is affording to the Second
Amendment liberty interest because the purpose of the NRTC-to create a police
function carve-out for state reciprocity for CHLs in respect of the Second
Amendment right recognized in McDonald and Heller-is at odds with both the bill
it amends and the individual right it purportedly seeks to secure. First, the primary
purpose of the GCA is to reinforce state and local laws in reducing gun violence;
however, the NRTC removes from states an integral element in reducing gun
crime-determining the people who can legally own and conceal one.19 Second,
the only Second Amendment right recognized in Heller was "handguns held and
used for self-defense in the home,",' not rights to carry concealed handguns out of
the house and across state borders or to be licensed for concealed carry in a state
with different eligibility laws. Although the Heller Court admittedly did not
undertake "an exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the full scope of the Second
Amendment," the Court explicitly disclaimed that its ruling jeopardized the
longstanding prohibitions on presumptively lawful ownership eligibility
requirements, prohibitions which explicitly included concealed carry because states
did not collectively protect that right at the time of the Second Amendment.' 7'
167. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 74, 89 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
170. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 618 (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 340 (Oliver Wendel Holmes,
Jr. ed., 12th ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1873) ("As the Constitution of the United States, and the
constitutions of several of the states, in terms more or less comprehensive, declare the right of the people to
keep and bear arms, it has been a subject of grave discussion, in some of the state courts, whether a statute
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Even if merely presumptive, Peterson, supported by Kachalsky and Hightower,
engaged in the necessary historical review of the public carriage of arms and
determined no such right firmly existed at the adoption of the Second
Amendment.17 Accordingly, by claiming its purpose is to affirm the Supreme
Court's holdings in Heller and McDonald, the NRTC does just the opposite,
fostering a great ambiguity, like the ambiguity addressed in Gregory, as to the
proper scope Second Amendment rights permissibly protectable. Just as Justice
O'Connor found it at least ambiguous as to whether state judges fell within the
scope of the federal wage law, it is entirely ambiguous, and likely improbable, that
the NRTC's CHL protections properly comport with the GCA or fall within the
scope of the right protected by the Second Amendment.1 3
It is not enough that supporters of the NRTC analogize driver's licenses with
the CHLs in an effort to bring them within the scope of permissible federal
regulation because this comparison misapprehends the distinction between
constitutional rights and federal law and the place of each within the federalist
structure of dual sovereigns. As Justice O'Connor affirmed in Gregory, and as
reaffirmed in New York, Lopez, Printz, and Sebelius, the purpose of federalism is to
safeguard individual liberty, a constitutional precept, from the overreaching of
federal law, and because Heller and McDonald confirm the Second Amendment
right is an individual right fundamental to an ordered scheme of liberty, federalism
must secure the right as the Country recognized it at the inception of the Second
Amendment.17 4 Ironically, the constitutional ignorance of the NRTC undercuts its
aim to secure Second Amendment protections because it removes from the liberty
interest of lawful gun ownership the necessary state involvement of citizens shaping
broader contours of that right according to their perceptions of local health, safety,
and welfare not offensive to the Constitution. 75
Ultimately, the NRTC's lack of clear purpose and provisions as to the Second
Amendment liberty protected under the Act contributes to the lack of clear
congressional divide upon which representatives-state or federal-can be held
accountable, undermining the political safeguards standard as applied in Gregory.
prohibiting persons, when not on a journey, or as travelers, from wearing or carrying concealed weapons, be
constitutional. There has been a great difference of opinion on the question.")).
172. See supra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
173. To the extent the NRTC reflects a political agenda, the CHL state reciprocity function further fails to
respect the Court's holding in Heller that the scope of constitutional rights is not subject congressional
manipulation when legislators disagree with them. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
174. See supra Part III.
175. In fact, the NFCT could result in more Second Amendment restrictions within states because states
may be forced to compensate for the regulatory failures of other states; states may have to alter interior
regulation because exterior CHL eligibility laws negatively impact their police function on the manner of both
ownership and possession. For example, Virginia offers on-line classes to obtain a CHL, and other states
have expressed concerns that such facilitation to receive a CHL may adversely impact their state and state
policies; in Texas, a state which requires extensive training to obtain a CHL, the Land Commissioner has
stated, "I'm more concerned that the online course doesn't give folks the knowledge they need to have about
Texas law than I am about them not being proficient." Virginia's Online Classes make it Easy for Out-of-state
Gun Owners to Get Permits, Fox NEWS, (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/09/03/online-
classes-make-it-easy-for-non-virginia-gun-owners-to-get-permits/#ixzz2DLpSK9xt.
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176 The NRTC fails the Gregory formation of Garcia's political safeguards standard
because it does not hedge against defective procedural processes, being ambiguous
as to delineations of political accountability. First, the NRTC ignores that certain
states maintain lesser concealed licensing requirements; for example, a Georgia
resident with a mental infirmity may be lawfully licensed to carry a concealed
handgun in Florida even though Florida bars individuals with mental infirmities
from obtaining a CHL."n Second, even under circumstances where both states
share common eligibility requirements, states differ on threshold inquiries; for
example, both Tennessee and Virginia prohibit felons from obtaining a CHL, yet
Virginia classifies theft of goods greater than $200 as a felony whereas Tennessee
classifies theft of goods less than $500 as a misdemeanor." Third, some states
currently enter into reciprocal CHL agreements but only after a complete analysis
of shared eligibility requirements, in part to ensure those individuals within its
borders it considers to be dangerous to the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens
may not lawfully possess or carry a concealed handgun; indeed, Texas only enters
into reciprocal CHL arrangements with states which perform background checks. 9
Accordingly, it remains unclear to whom a Florida, Tennessee, and Texas resident
would hold accountable-the federal government for passing the NRTC or internal
state representatives for not requiring or pressuring stronger eligibility thresholds or
altering non-eligibility possession requirements-for perceived inadequacies in
Second Amendment laws.
2. The NRTC Violates Anti-commandeering Prohibitions
Even if Congress clearly regulates CHLs under its Commerce Clause power in
the NRTC, Congress cannot force states into reciprocal recognition of other states'
firearm eligibility laws as such a measure effectively compels legislation and
insulates both federal and neighboring state legislators from political accountability.
Because the NRTC prohibits any CHL-administering state from discriminating
against an individual on the basis of an out-of-state CHL, the Act forces states to
regulate according to a federally-induced scheme. First, the NRTC compels a race-
to-the-bottom structure."' Within this structure, states are compelled to reduce
176. See supra Section III.A.2.
177. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 17.
178. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-105 (2012), with VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-95 (West 1998).
179. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 411.173(b) (West 2012). The NRTC does not create the concept of
state reciprocity generally; a number of states maintain reciprocal agreements with other states concerning
several issues affecting their citizens and government, from state income taxes to teacher licenses to driver's
licenses. As to reciprocity of CHLs, thirteen states recognize CHLs in all other forty seven issuing states
while seven states recognize permits from less than nineteen other states. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at
20.
180. See Press Release, Representative Jerrod Nadler, GOP Gun Bill Solves None of Our Nation's
Problems, Increases Number of Guns in our Communities, (Nov. 16, 2011), https://nadler.house.gov/press-
release/nadler-gop-gun-bill-solves-none-our-nation%E2%80%99s-problems-increases-number-guns-our
(claiming NRTC is a race-to-the-bottom and is shocking when viewed in light that those who support the Act
are advocates of States' rights); cf Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 506-07 (2004)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (suggesting some merit to the EPA claim that it needs oversight authority to prevent
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CHL eligibility requirements in order to increase CHL revenue, a type of "gun to
the head" regulation that is more than mere financial inducement as it directly
implicates economic pressures outside the control of Congress.' This race-to-the-
bottom structure violates Sebelius. Second, even if the economic compulsion is
insufficiently coercive, the effect upon safety, health, and welfare of a state's
citizenry illustrates an alternative measure of the significant perils of the NRTC's
coercive structure. Instead of forcing states to de-regulate eligibility laws for
revenue, the Act could force states to increase regulation in fear of facing the
federal burdens of forced state reciprocity; protection against the substantive risks
posed to the health and safety of the public is just as significant as financial
incentives, as suggested in New York and the compulsion to take title to radioactive
waste.18 Like Sebelius and New York, either course of de-regulation or hyper-
regulation of domestic legislation is crafted not according to local moral and policy
judgments but at the direction of external and ulterior motivations precipitated by
the actions of other states via federal regulation.
Yet, when state voters are dissatisfied with the substantive CHL eligibility
laws, local legislators bear the electoral burden rather than the federal government
or neighboring legislators, even though congressmen and neighboring state
legislators were the two parties responsible for the substantive law now affecting
in-state citizens; local citizens of states with stiff eligibility requirements have no
political recourse to the burdens of deficient CHL law because they can neither vote
against federal legislators not in their district nor vote against state legislators not in
their state. By insulating both federal and neighboring state legislators from
political accountability, the NRTC's national reciprocity mandate adds an
additional layer of political un-accountability at the state level, a broader yet more
exacting frustration of New York: Congress cannot directly force states to legislate
according to their scheme because doing so diminishes political accountability and
prevents state officials from "regulat[ing] in accordance with the views of the local
electorate. .. .. ""' And because the burden is born most harshly on state police, the
NRTC also violates the New York rationale as extended in Printz. The burden of
enforcing reciprocally recognized CHLs falls most harshly on state police, as it did
in Printz, because police officers must learn and enforce various state eligibility
laws as well as the legally required physical features of concealed carry licenses.184
Accordingly, the NRTC's structure dissolves the political safeguards that are
necessary under Garcia, as interpreted and applied in Sebelius, New York and
Printz, for congressional Commerce Clause legislation to be constitutional.
a race-to-the-bottom, "where jurisdictions compete with each other to lower environmental standards to attract
new industries and keep existing businesses within their borders").
181. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604-05 (rejecting the mere financial inducement of the Affordable Care
Act because it dictates regulation as to ten percent of states' overall budgets).
182. See New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
183. See id. at 169.
184. See H.R. 822, 112' Cong. (2011) §§ 3-4 (requiring the Comptroller General to conduct an audit of
concealed carry laws and regulations of each state as well as a study on the ability of local law enforcement to
verify the validity of out-of-state permits or licenses).
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CONCLUSION
State regulation of lawful handgun ownership fundamentally shaped the
individual right the Second Amendment secures as liberty, and state regulations of
concealed carry continue to shape the liberty interest of lawful handgun possession
and ownership. By securing a right of concealed carry on a national scale without
concern toward the role the State has and must continue to maintain in shaping the
contours of Second Amendment rights, the National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity
Act, like its national right-to-carry counterparts, steals from states their traditional
state police function in handgun regulation. In that act of robbery, the Act
misconceives the right it seeks to protect, thereby causing great confusion as to
what substantive law affects states' citizens and to whom those citizens hold
responsible when the law does not fairly represent their interests. Compounding the
confusion is that even if citizens discern which legislative representatives to hold
responsible for inadequate CHL law, they are limited to voting within their federal
and state districts, not those of neighboring states where the substantive law that
directly impacts their individual liberty is crafted. The NRTC's federal mandate
forces states into a system without any process for which the interests of their
citizens can be represented. States are required to accept the notions of another
state legislature via the federal legislature without initial involvement or subsequent
recourse-they neither shape the law nor can change it should it be detrimental to
their interests. Conclusively, even in the unlikely event the Act permissibly
regulates concealed handgun licenses under the Commerce Clause, the National
Right-to-Carry Act remains unconstitutional for confounding the Second
Amendment liberty interest protected and contravening the political safeguards
necessary to ensure the individual right therein is not offended.
3632012-13]

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS
The Journal ofLegislation is a semiannual publication by students at Notre Dame Law
School. The Journal is a law review that focuses on statutory, regulatory, and public
policy issues rather than on case law. The Journal believes in the open debate of all
political ideologies and philosophical points of view. Therefore, the Journal has
traditionally solicited legislators, judges, administrators, and prominent attorneys, as well
as scholars and recognized experts from beyond the legal arena. The Journal publishes
articles, legislative reform pieces, essays (scholarly editorials), book reviews and student
notes.
Manuscripts submitted for publication should be typewritten on 8 1/2" x 11" paper and
should be double-spaced. Authors should submit articles using Microsoft Word
formatting. Footnotes should conform to A Uniform System of Citation (19th ed. 2010).
Citations using large and small caps (e.g., law reviews, books, titles, etc.) should appear
in bold with upper and lower case letters. A paragraph on the title page should provide
the author's current occupation, position, and educational background.
Decisions on publications are typically made within four weeks of a manuscript's receipt.
The Journal accepts submissions on a rolling basis. Most article selections for an issue
are made two to six months prior to publication. Thus, to be considered for publication in
the Spring issue, please send your manuscript between September and February; to be
considered for our Fall issue, please submit your article between March and August.
Student editors edit articles accepted for publication, and the Journal submits editorial
changes to the author for approval before publication. The Journal reserves the right of
final decision concerning all manuscript changes. When an article is approved for
publication, the Journal will request that the author assign the copyright for the
manuscript to the Journal to comply with the copyright laws of the United States.
Manuscripts should be submitted to:
Editor-in-Chief
Journal of Legislation
Notre Dame Law School
Notre Dame, Indiana 46556
Phone: (574) 631-5918
Submissions by email are also welcome.
Email: ndjleg@nd.edu

